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SUB CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUPPLEMENT, SHAM, OR SUBSTITUTE? 
MARK TuSHNET* 
Professor Coenen has given us an extraordinarily valuable 
examination of sub constitutional doctrines that allow the Supreme 
Court to influence legislative choice without dictating it.1 Professor 
Coenen presents subconstitutional doctrines as supplements to 
the forms of judicial review that dominate theorizing about 
constitutional law. Those dominating forms, which I call sub-
stantive judicial review, involve the displacement oflegislative and 
executive choice by the courts' specification of constitutional norms. 
In contrast, the sub constitutional doctrines Professor Coenen 
describes and commends allow the political branches to pursue 
their preferred policies, if only they do so in the proper way. But, 
according to Professor Coenen, sub constitutional doctrines still 
leave open the possibility of substantive judicial review. 
In this brief Comment I make two points.2 First, the sub-
constitutional doctrines appear to have the advantage of allowing 
elected lawmakers to pursue whatever course they wish, as long as 
they satisfy the requirements of these subconstitutional doctrines. 
In practice, however, what appears to be a provisional invalidation 
based on sub constitutional law turns out to be-and, indeed, 
might be expected at the moment of decision to be-a final, 
unrevisable decision.3 Further, courts might strategically deploy 
• Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center. 
1. See Dan T. Coenen,A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values 
with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARy L. REV. 1575 (2001). I 
understand Professor Coenen's reasons for using the term structural to describe the rules he 
discusses. See id. at 1583-94, 1596-1603. I prefer the term subconstitutional nonetheless, in 
part because it avoids the kinds of confusions that Professor Coenen is careful to dispel in 
his article. 
2. Professor Coenen mentions these problems near the conclusionofhis comprehensive 
article but does not explore them in detail. See id. at 1845-51. 
3. I note that some of the doctrines Professor Coenen discusses-the doctrines dealing 
withno-Ionger-advancedjustffications, desuetude, and changed-facts-might be defended on 
the ground that they perform the function of cleansing the statute books of laws that 
legislatures today would not enact but have not yet repealed. This may be because the 
1871 
HeinOnline -- 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1872 2000-2001
1872 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1871 
these sub constitutional doctrines to avoid the sting of the charge 
that they are foreclosing legislative choice while effectively doing so. 
Second, one might fairly question the need for conclusive judicial 
review in the classic mode precisely because these doctrines are so 
widely available. Normatively, a combination of full democratic 
choice coupled with sub constitutional doctrine~ to ensure that such 
choice is informed, carefully made, and the like, might be more 
attractive than a system in which democratic choice is limited 
substantively by the courts. Exactly what extra value does 
democratic self-governance get from conclusive judicial review? 
Pretty clearly, not all that much, in light of the scope of these 
sub constitutional doctrines. 
These two points are obviously in some tension with each other, 
and I do not wish to urge that one or the other is correct. Rather, I 
suggest that developing a more complete understanding of 
sub constitutional doctrines will require us to grapple with these 
and other objections that Professor Coenen mentions largely in 
passing. Professor Coenen's survey of sub constitutional law is so 
comprehensive that I can hope to use only selected examples to 
support these two observations. I believe, though, that my 
observations can be extended beyond the particular examples I use. 
I. SUBCONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AS SHAM? 
The deep structure, so to speak, of subconstitutional rules is this: 
The Court says to a legislature, "You tried to accomplish goal X 
through means A. But, you can't do that. We're not saying that you 
are precluded in principle from accomplishing goal X. Rather, you 
can accomplish goal X, but only by using means B or C.» The 
problem with this approach is that means A may be the only 
politically feasible method of accomplishing goal X. The Court 
effectively forecloses the accomplishment of the goal it says is 
available in principle, by foreclosing the only politically feasible 
method. And, notably, it does so without having to defend the 
legislatures have more important things to do or, more interestingly, because the outdated 
statutes still have enough supporters to make repeal politically risky. I think this a valuable 
function, but it pretty clearly does not raise the kinds of questions of democratic self-
governance that more robust forms of judicial review do. 
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proposition that the Constitution properly interpreted really does 
foreclose the legislature from accomplishing goal X.4 
An example from Canada provides a useful illustration. 
Morgentaler v. The Queen, Canada's abortion case, invalidated that 
nation's regulation of abortion.5 It did so on what appears in the 
. first instance to be structural or subconstitutional grounds. The 
statute making it a crime to obtain or perform an abortion also 
provided a defense. Putting it roughly, doctors would escape 
criminal liability if they showed that they had obtained the 
permission of a hospital committee finding the abortion medically 
appropriate. But, the Canadian Supreme Court said, the facts 
showed that this defense was actually illusory because hospital 
committees were unable to give their permission in a timely 
manner. It would seem, then, that the Canadian Parliament could 
continue to criminalize abortion by developing a better system 
through which someone would give the doctors the permission 
necessary to immunize them from criminal liability. 6 Things turned 
out otherwise. Afraid to take a position on what was clearly a 
divisive political issue, the government allowed a vote on a revision 
of the abortion law, but made it a "free"-that is, nonparty 
line-vote.7 Parliamentary maneuvering produced a legislative 
stalemate, and the law crimina]jzing abortion went unrevised. That 
law was, of course, unenforceable after the Morgentaler decision. A 
purportedly procedural ruling had conclusive substantive effect. 
The Morgentaler model can be generalized. A statute results from 
the confluence of political forces at the time of enactment. Some 
other statute would have been enacted if those forces had been 
different. Provisionally invalidating a statute may have conclusive 
effect when those political forces remain unchanged, because the 
statute actually enacted may have been the only one that could 
have emerged from the political process. And, I should emphasize, 
this may be true even if all participants in the legislative process 
gave as complete conside,ration of the lurking constitutional 
4. Professor Coenen notes this concern. See id. at 1850. 
5. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. 
6. Or, presumably, to eliminate the defense entirely. 
7. For a description of the post-Morgenthaler legislative activity, see F.L. MORTON, PRO-
CHOICE V. PRo-LIFE: ABORTION AND THE CoURTS IN CANADA 290-93 (1992). 
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questions as the sub constitutional doctrines demand. It is not that 
the legislature failed to consider relevant constitutional issues. 
Perhaps each legislator fully considered those issues. Then, when 
the legislators' diverse views were aggregated in the process of 
enacting legislation, the result was a statute that did not-because 
it could not-reflect on its face any specific position on the 
constitutional issues.8 
The foregoing conclusion should be qualified. First, the contours 
of the political terrain may have changed. In particular, proponents 
of the policy in question may have gained enough power that they 
can now do something they could not do earlier: enact a statute that 
complies with the Court's sub constitutional demands. Some of 
Professor Coenen's time-linked sub constitutional rules make sense 
precisely because, as he notes, they provide a chance for a new 
political coalition to determine whether, and to what extent, it 
wishes to pursue a policy adopted by a prior coalition. The new 
coalition might in principle want to eliminate the old coalition's 
policy, but the new coalition might have higher priorities. Judicial 
invalidation pursuant to a sub constitutional rule gives the new 
coalition what it needs without having to affront the old one 
directly. In this setting the courts act as political allies of a new 
political coalition, accomplishing part of the new coalition's agenda 
without taking up the legislature's limited time. One could, of 
course, wonder whether courts serving this function are 
demonstrating the kind of independence of politics that we usually 
associate with rule-of-Iaw ideals.9 
Second, the Court's decision may give new information to the 
contending parties, and that information may have some impact on 
the political balance. Political forces contend over the precise 
location of an outcome in what political scientists call a policy 
8. I emphasize that my argument combines a perspective drawn from political science 
with the normative concerns of traditional constitutional theory, and that, given my training 
as a lawyer, I think it would be profitable for political scientists to weigh in on the matters 
about which they are more knowledgeable than I. 
9. A survey identifying the actual time lags between enactment (or reasoned 
reconsideration, as Judge Calabresi suggested in his opinion in Quill v. Vacca, 80 F.3d 716, 
735,738-43 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring» and the judicial invocation of these 
time-linked rules would be quite useful as a basis for assessing the contribution these 
techniques make to the constitutional order. 
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space.10 Sometimes the outcome results not so much from the 
balance of political forces but from contingent facts: agenda control 
by one or another actor, the press of time as a legislative session 
ends and opportunities for amendment and compromise disappear, 
and the like. Many outcomes in the policy space would be politically 
acceptable to the contending forces. The Court's new decision may 
shift the result from one point within the policy space of potential 
outcomes to another. 
The doctrines dealing with the "who" of decision making that 
Professor Coenen identifies may have this effect.ll Consider a 
President who would like to make policy on some matter, but who 
faces resistance from Congress. The President can overcome 
resistance by yielding on some other matter of less importance to 
him or her. The President's bargaining position is strengthened by 
a sub constitutional doctrine saying that the President is the only 
decision maker the Constitution permits. Notably, however, these 
sub constitutional doctrines do not mean that the President (or other 
decision maker identified by the doctrines) necessarily prevails. A 
President who moves too far outside what Congress is willing to 
accept will be confronted with retaliation in some other area of 
presidential concern.12 Again, the sub constitutional doctrines shift 
the outcome from one point within the policy space defined by the 
balance of political forces to another, but rarely will they shift the 
outcome to a point outside that policy space. 
With these possibilities in mind, we should also consider that 
sometimes the Court may want to foreclose the possibility of 
legislation without openly defending .that desire. The Justices may 
calculate that barring the legislature from using the means it has 
chosen will have the effect of making further action impossible, as 
in the Morgentqler situation. The idea here is that the Justices 
10. See CHARLES M. CAMETON, VETO BARGAINING: PREsIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF 
NEGATIVE POWER 86 (2000). 
11. See Coenen, supra note 1, at 1773-1805. 
12. The well-documented persistence of effective legislative vetoes even after INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), is an example of the role that political forces continue to play 
even after the Court identifies a constitutionally mandated decision maker. For a discussion 
of the persistence of legislative vetoes or ~eir functional equivalent after Chadha, see 
JESSICA KoRN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION: AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONALISM AND THE MYTH 
OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO (1996). 
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engage in a certain kind of political prediction on two levels: one 
about the public acceptability of a substantive decision, and one 
about the possibility of legislative enactment of the same 
substantive policy, but in a different form. A strategic Court would 
invoke sub constitutional doctrines after calculating that the risk of 
public rejection of a substantive decision is too high and that the 
legislature will be unable to reenact the statute in the form that the 
sub constitutional doctrine suggests would be constitutional. 
As Professor Coenen notes, such calculations, if they occur, may 
be mistaken. The Court developed clear-statement rules to protect 
states from monetary liability under federal statutes.13 It turned 
out that the beneficiaries of Congress's first efforts had enough 
power to get Congress to reenact the statutes with sufficiently clear 
statements. The Court then imposed the substantive limits 
anyway. 14 
The state immunity cases suggest a broader concern. Sometimes 
invoking sub constitutional rules is a sham, when the Court 
correctly calculates that those rules eHmjnate the only political 
feasible method of reaching the legislature's desired goal. And it is 
unclear what the sub constitutional rules contribute if, in the end, 
the Court must confront the underlying substantive question 
anyway. 15 
II. SUBCONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AS SUBSTITUTE? 
Professor Coenen's catalogue of sub constitutional doctrines is so 
comprehensive that I am left wondering, what role is left for 
substantive constitutional review? Suppose that courts sincerely 
deploy these sub constitutional doctrines, structuring decision 
making by the political branches in a way that ensures reasonably 
13. See Coenen, supra note 1, at 1624-26 (discussing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 
473 U.S. 234 (1985». 
14. See id. at1626. Notably, the substantive decisions have been far more controversial, 
at least among commentators, than the clear-statement decisions. That is, the Court's first-
level political calculation, about public acceptability, appears to have been correct even 
though its second-level one was not. 
15. I note, for example, that Professor Coenen wonders whether the subconstitutional 
rules developed in the current Court's early state immunity cases should survive now that 
the Court has imposed a substantive limitation on Congress's power. See id. at 1627-29. 
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full consideration of constitutionally sensitive issues. Why should 
the courts play any other role? 
I am. less skeptical than many others of the political branches' 
ability to deal reasonably with constitutional issues.16 The Court's 
sub constitutional doctrines, if anything, are likely to improve the 
political branches' performance. We should consider the possibility 
that these doctrines improve the political branches' performance so 
much that the need for substantive review will disappear. One need 
not be a Pollyanna about this possibility. The political branches will 
never be perfect constitutional decision makers, under any 
particular criterion of goodness. But, then, neither will the Court, 
unless the criterion of constitutional goodness is the pur~ly 
positivist one that says, "The Constitution is what the Supreme 
Court says it is." Both the Court and the political branches, that is, 
will make constitutional errors according to any specified criterion. 
It could be that the sub constitutional doctrines, properly deployed,17 
reduce the number and significance of the political branches' errors 
to the point where they are less important than the errors the 
courts commit. 
Professor Coenen notes this argument, albeit in a somewhat 
sidewise manner. He defends the invocation of subconstitutional 
doctrines on the ground that they "reflect a wise and deeply rooted 
commitment to judicial restraint" while "leav[ing] courts with 
significant powers," particularly traditional substantive review. 18 
Professor Coenen's defense of sub constitutional doctrines suggests 
the form he would give in a direct response to the question of the 
need for substantive judicial review. As I read his final section, 
Professor Coenen finds the normative justification for doctrine, 
whether it be subconstitutional doctrine or substantive judicial 
review, in long-standing practice supported by "text, tradition, 
history, and precedent."19 
16. See Mark Tushnet, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation: Some Criteria and 
Two Informal Case Studies, DUKE L. J. (forthcoming 2001). 
17. That is, taking into account the possibility that the Court will make a mistake in 
invoking one of the subconstitutional doctrines, just as it can make mistakes in substantive 
review. 
18. Coenen, supra note 1, at 1834-35. 
19. Id. at 1851. 
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Notably absent from this is an obvious additional candidate: 
normative democratic theory. The reason for that absence is clear 
enough to me. Reconciling substantive constitutional review with 
normative democratic theory has proved enormously difficult. As far 
as I can tell, all efforts at reconciliation founder on a single 
problem. There are uncontroversial constitutional norms such as 
"protect free speech" and "treat everyone with equal dignity and 
respect." Difficulty arises when we try to figure out what those 
abstract and uncontroversial norms mean in any particular setting, 
that is, when we try to determine whether a specific statute 
contravenes the norms. Reasonable people can reasonably disagree 
on particular applications even while they agree on the abstract 
norms. Typically, substantive judicial review is defended on the 
ground that courts have institutional characteristics that make 
them more likely than the political branches to select a specification 
of the abstract norm that lies within the range of reasonableness. 
That defense seems to me quite hard to make out once we have, as 
I believe we should have, an appropriately expansive sense ofwhat 
the range of reasonable specifications of the abstract norms is.20 
Skeptics might respond by identifying a Supreme Court decision, 
decided on substantive grounds, that is unequivocally right 
according to some criterion. Candidates might be Brown v. Board 
ofEducation21 or Texas v. Johnson.22 The general form of my reply 
to the skeptic would be to identify potential subconstitutional 
doctrines that might have been invoked to avoid the substantive 
decision while offering the political branches the opportunity to 
reconsider their commitment to the questioned statutes. The 
skeptic might reply that the candidate cases are good ones to test 
my claim because they are cases where the nearly certain response 
from the political branches would have been the readoption of the 
statutes. I think that this reply is a good one for Texas v. Johnson.23 
20. For my elaboration oftbis argument, see MARKTusHNET, TAKINGTHECONSTlTUl'ION 
AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). See also FRANKl. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY, 
ch. 1 (1999). 
21. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding school segregation unconstitutional). 
22. 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (finding unconstitutional a statute that prohibited flag 
desecration). 
23. I emphasize again that identifying one or more legislative errors corrected by the 
courts through substantive judicial review is insufficient to establish the overall value ofsuch 
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I wonder, though, whether there might not be subconstitutional 
doctrines that would have allowed the Court in Brown to insist that 
imposing a policy of segregation had to be done on the national level 
(a "who decides" kind of sub constitutional doctrine, in Professor 
Coenen's terms), pursuant to a clearer statement than existed in 
any statute on the books in 1954. That would have forced the 
proponents of segregation to take the initiative in Congress, andmy 
guess is that they would have been unable to obtain enough support 
there to enact segregation policies even though they had enough 
power to block the enactment of antisegregation ones. 
Sub constitutional doctrines, however, need not be inconsistent 
with normative democratic theory if they do not foreclose any 
substantive legislative choice. They clearly do not do so in theory, 
for their entire point is to ensure full consideration of constitutional 
norms by the political branches without dictating the content of 
those branches' conclusions.24 Professor Coenen might have 
strengthened the case for sub constitutional doctrines by invoking 
normative democratic theory.25 In doing so, though, he would have 
been less able to defend sub constitutional review on the ground 
that, after all is said and done, it preserves the possibility of 
substantive judicial review. But, it is unclear to me why one should 
regard that loss as a matter of regret. 
CONCLUSION 
As Professor Coenen shows, scholars have noticed the exis-
tence of sub constitutional doctrines before, and some have even 
tried to generalize them into a theory of structural due process. 
Professor Coenen's signal contribution is to demonstrate that 
sub constitutional doctrines are more common than even prior 
review. A full assessment must also consider errors the courts themselves make in exercising 
substantive judicial review, and determine whether the judicial errors are less important 
overall than the errors made by the political branches. And, of course, all this depends on 
there being some agreement among the discussants on what the criterion for identifying 
errors is. 
24. As discussed earlier, subconstitutional doctrines may foreclose su'bstantive choices 
in practice. See supra notes 4-15 and accompanying text. 
25. See TuSHNET, supra note 20, at 163-65, for a brief discussion of this point. Were I to 
write that passage again, I would certainly cite Professor Coenen's work. 
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scholars have thought, and indeed that such doctrines pervade the 
Supreme Court's work. In doing so, Professor Coenen makes it 
possible to ask what these doctrines actually do, and whether they 
are so pervasive that we could get along quite well with 
sub constitutional doctrine and no substantive judicial review. 
Professor Coenen's important article does what good scholarship 
should: open up paths for further exploration. Perhaps this 
Comment shows that some of those paths might lead to quite 
unexpected destinations. So much the better for his article. 
